India, May 26 -- The Indian response to the Pahalgam terror attack and its aftermath has by itself not fundamentally altered the regional geopolitics, but it has highlighted some important aspects of South Asia's evolving balance of power. The Indo-Pak military standoff this time differs from the previous episodes and acts as a shadow of the region's future geopolitical trajectories. Even though it was the US that reportedly made midnight calls to India and Pakistan to bring an end to the conflict which Washington mistakenly assumed was escalating to nuclear levels, what the standoff makes abundantly clear is that the structure of the regional balance of power has changed. It is safe to say that China has replaced the US as the most consequential power in South Asia. While the US continues to be the most powerful military actor globally, geopolitical influence depends on both power and intent. Currently, the US appears to lack a clear strategic purpose for the region and, as a result, Washington today is a mere shadow of what it used to be in the region. Beijing has more or less replaced Washington. As a military supplier, arbiter, diplomatic presence, and economic heavyweight, China is well placed to shape the region's events. China will seek to influence the outcomes of regional military conflicts, diplomatic standoffs or political contestations either through provision of high-tech weaponry, as we saw in the recent conflict, or through direct diplomatic involvement or economic pressure. While Beijing's growing influence was already evident in South Asia and the Indo-Pacific, the length of China's shadow from a military-matters standpoint in this round of India-Pakistan conflict was a revelation. The second most significant aspect of contemporary South Asian geopolitics is the unmissable decline of Russia's capacity to serve as India's most consequential strategic partner. During the recent standoff, Russia's response was like that of any other State - it did not explicitly support India. It neither mentioned Pakistan by name nor endorsed India's military actions against it. Russia's ministry of foreign affairs stated that "Russia strongly condemns acts of terrorism, opposes any of its manifestations and emphasises the need to unite the efforts of the entire world community to effectively combat this evil", and it urged both sides to exercise restraint to prevent further escalation. In a sense Russia said in the India-Pakistan context what India had said in the Russia-Ukraine context. If India was balancing between Russia and the West, Russia was balancing between India and China. Russia may have little stakes in South Asia, but a Moscow closely aligned with Beijing, which is close to Islamabad, will do as little as possible to assist India when China's interests are at stake. It is not that Russia intends to harm India's regional interests, but it is reluctant to be perceived as undermining China's interests, which eventually benefits Pakistan. There was a time when we thought we could influence Chinese behaviour through Russia, but today what we are perhaps witnessing is China moderating Russia's closeness to India. Russia's interest in India is waning, just as India's interest in Russia has been diminishing - this is a structural reality which we must accept. Our goal should be to identify and leverage ways to manage this relationship in decline. The third most significant aspect of the regional geopolitics that was evident during the standoff was the inherent limits of external balancing options available to India. Most of India's global partners were more concerned about a nuclear exchange in South Asia - even if there is little basis for it - than looking for ways to help India, diplomatically, politically or militarily. The Western response to the standoff was akin to the Indian response to the Ukraine war, that conflicts must be resolved through dialogue. So, what the recent incident taught us is that our partners are likely to deal with us on the basis of reciprocity in times of crisis. While our decision not to be part of any military alliances is a conscious choice, and perhaps the right one, we must also be conscious of its consequences: Our wars will be ours alone to fight. The policy direction, then, is clear. We must pursue internal balancing, by making substantial investments in defence and national security preparedness. There should be greater encouragement and a conducive environment for the country's private sector to invest in defence, engage in co-production with local and international partners, and invest in high-tech defence capabilities. Fourth, considering that the government has articulated a new doctrine to deal with terrorism, even if not in the written form, it would be beneficial to establish a high-level task force to objectively assess various aspects of Operation Sindoor. This group can recommend necessary steps for India's future defence preparedness, intelligence, strategic communications, and other key areas. Perhaps, the time has come to establish a Pahalgam and After Review Committee, modeled after the Kargil Review Committee, to objectively evaluate recent developments and guide future strategic directions. Finally, military standoffs of this nature and intensity tend to divert attention often at the expense of the country's broader strategic goals. Contemporary India cannot afford to be confined to South Asia or to be locked in a narrow focus on Pakistan, which will restrict its ability to spare its already limited political, diplomatic, and military resources for other broader objectives. The biggest strategic challenge to India would be becoming entangled in the cyclical back-and-forth of Indo-Pak tensions....