India, June 5 -- More than a week after a container ship with sensitive cargo sank off the Kerala coast, there are few indications of how the incident occurred, or of the full extent of environmental damage. While port authorities maintain there has been no significant oil spill, the discovery of floating nurdles along coastlines in Kerala and Tamil Nadu has raised red flags. The underlying regulatory questions remain unanswered. The capsizing of the Liberia-flagged MSC ELSA 3, about 40 nautical miles off Kochi, has exposed troubling gaps in India's coastal governance. The vessel was carrying 643 containers, including a declared consignment of hazardous materials such as calcium carbide, a volatile chemical known to react explosively with seawater. It was also reportedly laden with furnace oil and diesel for propulsion. That such a ship - seemingly under opaque ownership and possibly flagged to a convenience registry - was allowed to transit between two Indian ports without closer scrutiny reveals a deeper malaise - a regulatory culture overly reliant on paperwork and cursory checks, rather than robust, ground-level enforcement. India's maritime authorities, particularly the Indian Coast Guard (ICG), responded with commendable efficiency in the immediate aftermath of the capsize. ICG swiftly deployed patrol vessels and aircraft to monitor the site and contain potential threats. Oil-spill dispersants were applied, and infrared sensors were used to track surface contamination. The tactical response was prompt and professionally executed. Yet effective crisis management is no substitute for strong preventive oversight. ELSA 3's passage from Vizhinjam to Kochi, a short domestic leg possibly linked to cargo bound for a longer voyage, should have raised multiple red flags. The vessel was registered in Liberia - known for its open registry and lax regulatory controls. As one of the most prominent "flags of convenience" (FoC) States, Liberia is frequently used by shipowners seeking to avoid stricter labour, safety, and environmental standards. Tellingly, Liberia has reportedly declined to cooperate with any formal probe, forcing Indian authorities to confront the legal and regulatory fallout alone. The vessel's crew composition and operational history only deepen concerns. Over the past two decades, ELSA 3 had reportedly changed names and flags multiple times - a practice known as flag hopping, often used to evade regulatory scrutiny. Its multinational crew, comprising Russians, Ukrainians, Georgians, and Filipinos, is not unusual in global shipping, but such combinations often signal low-cost, third-party management with diffuse lines of accountability. These are not trivial procedural lapses. When hazardous cargo is transported through domestic waters, transparency of ownership, clarity on crew competence, and rigour in cargo verification are non-negotiable. Yet there is no evidence that authorities conducted meaningful checks before ELSA 3 sailed from Vizhinjam. Equally troubling is the failure to translate technical risk into public safety measures. Fisherfolk and environmental groups in Kerala have expressed frustration over the absence of timely advisories and delayed official communication. Even as coastal communities reported floating debris, tar balls, and chemical odours, official response remained muted. India's legal frameworks for hazardous cargo management are comprehensive on paper. The Merchant Shipping (Carriage of Cargo) Rules, 1995, issued under the Merchant Shipping Act, 1958, require detailed cargo manifests, safety protocols, and hazard disclosures. India is also a signatory to the MARPOL Convention, which sets international standards for oil-spill prevention and marine pollution control. Yet the gap between regulation and enforcement remains glaring. Inspections are often perfunctory, reduced to formalities on paper with little physical verification. This is not an isolated incident. The 2017 oil spill near Chennai and a chemical leak off Mumbai in 2010 exposed severe shortcomings in enforcement and emergency preparedness. The 2011 sinking of the MV Rak, a poorly maintained, Panama-flagged vessel off the Mumbai coast, revealed similar flaws. The ship had continued operating in Indian waters despite repeated warnings about its condition. Subsequent investigations pointed to inadequate port inspections and poor inter-agency coordination, failings that mirror many aspects of the MSC ELSA 3 episode. A recurring theme in these incidents is the weakness of port State control - the mechanism by which countries inspect foreign-flagged vessels in their waters to ensure compliance with international standards. Indian authorities have long hesitated to strengthen this, allowing substandard ships to operate with impunity. ELSA 3, flagged for deficiencies in previous inspections - including one at Tuticorin last year-should have attracted greater scrutiny. India's cargo carriage norms also deserve closer examination. While coastal trade is nominally reserved for Indian-flagged vessels, a 2018 exemption permits foreign ships to carry certain categories of EXIM and agricultural cargo without a DG Shipping licence. ELSA 3's voyage likely qualified under these rules, but its hazardous cargo should have triggered a more rigorous inspection regime. At the very least, consignments involving reactive chemicals like calcium carbide must be publicly disclosed and centrally tracked. Fixing this ecosystem will require more than bureaucratic tightening. India must fundamentally reconsider its engagement with vessels flagged to jurisdictions known for lax compliance. This means expanding satellite tracking and Automatic Identification System (AIS) coverage, joining international efforts to monitor shadow fleets, and advocating for reform within the International Maritime Organisation (IMO). As coastal states like Kerala contend with the fallout from the ELSA 3 incident, India cannot credibly claim maritime leadership in the Indo-Pacific while tolerating regulatory blind spots in its own backyard. Maritime power is not only about naval presence or port expansion, it is also about governance, oversight, and accountability at sea. ELSA 3 capsizing may not have caused an immediate ecological catastrophe. But it has spotlighted India's chronic regulatory complacency. The next incident may not be so forgiving....