India, May 10 -- After the horrific massacre of civilian tourists in Pahalgam by Pakistani terrorists on April 22, India has adopted several new templates to deal with cross-border terrorism and its sponsors. Before delving into the new templates, let this be known that soon after the gruesome Pahalgam incident, the terrorists belonging to The Resistance Front (TRF), a well-known proxy of the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), had given away their identity. TRF took responsibility for this macabre incident. But after some communications with LeT headquarters in Muridke (near Lahore), which was intercepted in India, it tried to disown this responsibility. The new retaliatory templates adopted by India after the Pahalgam incident were based on our previous experience of dealing with cross-border terrorism. For many years, India's military response to cross-border terrorism had been to strike at the posts of the Pakistan army and the Rangers which facilitated the infiltration of terrorists into India. Although sporadic cross-border activity was undertaken by the Indian army (including some during my tenure), there was no political mandate or sanction to do so. The first paradigm shift in such operations took place after terrorists attacked the Uri military camp on September 18, 2016, in which 19 soldiers were killed. On September 29, the Indian Army retaliated with shallow surgical strikes on terrorists' launch pads. This was our first politically sanctioned proactive strike across the LoC. Two-and-half years later, on February 14, 2019, a Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) suicide bomber hit the convoy of vehicles carrying security personnel near Lethupura on Anantnag-Srinagar road. Forty-six CRPF personnel lost their lives in this incident. Twelve days later, it led to the second politically sanctioned escalatory aerial strike on the JeM training camp at Balakot in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province of Pakistan. The Pahalgam incident indicated that both these retaliatory efforts, and other counteractions of the past, had not deterred terrorist outfits. It, therefore, became necessary to send a stronger message to Pakistan after this incident. India adopted a whole-of-the-nation, multi-domain approach. An important step was taken to hold the Indus Waters Treaty of 1960 in abeyance. This step was considered many times earlier but could never get past the experts and political leadership. In addition, India took several diplomatic, direct and indirect trade-related steps. The government planned a stronger than any past kinetic strike on camps of terrorists in Pakistan: The very symbolic, tri-service Operation Sindoor. At 1.04 am on May 7, 2025, in keeping with the newly determined strategic policy and several new technological capabilities available with the armed forces, India launched Operation Sindoor. Nine camps of terrorists were struck with smart, stand-off rockets from air, land and sea. The targets included the LeT terrorist camp in Sialkot and the headquarters of JeM (Bahawalpur) and LeT (Muridke), located in the very heartland of Punjab of Pakistan. This was yet another shift in the template and a signal of new strategic resolve. Our armed forces deserve full credit for their meticulous planning and flawless execution of Operation Sindoor. The operational secrecy was maintained so well that despite preparatory time available to the Pakistani forces, our rockets and missiles literally caught them napping. With a full assessment of strikes still being made, and the war-like situation still evolving, the question in everyone's mind is what to expect in the short and long term. India's military action has been non-escalatory, proportionate and responsible action. In Pakistan, Operation Sindoor has struck at: one, the relationship between the Pakistan army and the terrorist organisations, as evident from the reports of the presence of Pakistan army personnel and laying of wreath on behalf of their army chief at the funeral of IC814 hijacking mastermind, Abdul Rauf Asghar; two, the public image of the Pakistan army (after the Indian strike on the Jaish headquarters in Bahawalpur, a witness on camera shouted, "kahan hai hamari fouj'); and three, the personal image of Pakistan army chief General Asim Munir, who is looking for an extension of service and showcasing his strong belief in the two-nation theory and radical Islamist mindset. As expected, Pakistan has retaliated with heavy and indiscriminate shelling of the civilian population residing close to the Line of Control and the international border in the Kathua-Jammu sector. It has tried to strike at civilian and military assets, which have been rebuffed by our armed forces. Our forces and public need to remain alert; be prepared to defend and follow a strategy of sustained retaliation like Israel. With superior comprehensive national power, India should be able to exercise escalation dominance and control. That, primarily, is in the domain of our diplomacy and the armed forces' actions on the ground. Our diplomatic activity is in full swing. It is forceful and credible. The long-term goal to eliminate cross-border terrorism is more difficult. First, it depends upon the old, well-established nexus between the Pakistan army and its proxies. Over the years, these proxies have become a part of Pakistan army's DNA and its military doctrine. They are cheap fodder; useful to save its lives and cover accountability. This goal will also depend upon civil-military relations in Pakistan. Will the Pakistan political leaders ever be able to exercise control over their military which controls the proxies through the ISI? Till any of the above-mentioned realities change, the Pakistan army will continue to make use of the nuclear umbrella, avoid conventional war, and indulge in cross-border terrorism from time to time. And we should be prepared to take action as we have done now....