India, Feb. 3 -- In Davos last week, a justifiably unhappy Canadian Prime Minister, Mark Carney, delivered what can be read as the funeral speech for the post-Cold War (America-led) world order. Emphasising that it is a "rupture, not a transition", the banker-turned politician introduced a term that should resonate well with New Delhi's view of the world - variable geometry. Two days later, in his speech at the Bundestag, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz echoed his transatlantic counterpart's sentiment, declaring that Europe must learn the "language of power politics". When two of the world's most polite nations - Canada and Germany - start speaking the language of hard power and strategic autonomy, we are not too far away from the end of the post-World War II order. For India, this is a moment of vindication: The country's commitment to strategic autonomy is proving to be the chosen template for other middle powers to navigate the vagaries of great power politics. History is often a story of unintended consequences, especially in world politics. The current middle-power scramble for security is a direct by-product of the strategic decisions, or overreach, of the Big Three: Russia, the US, and China. In his quest to rebuild the long-eclipsed Russian empire, President Vladimir Putin may be inadvertently helping the making of a German military powerhouse. Not just yet, but give Berlin some time. In 2022, Putin launched a "special military operation" to neuter NATO and prevent the emergence of a militarised West on Moscow's doorstep, and in his sphere of influence. Four years later, he may have instead achieved the exact opposite - the remilitarisation of Germany, or at least the beginning of it. Russia may win the war in Ukraine after all, but might find itself hard-pressed against a rearmed Europe. With an €83 billion defence budget for 2026 (which, in all probability, will be more than India's annual defence budget) and a commitment to continue to invest in defence, Berlin is on its way to becoming a major military power in Europe. What Putin wanted was a buffer; he now has a rising military power next door. Across the Atlantic Ocean, in his pursuit of America First, President Donald Trump may have taught his country's closest allies how to, eventually, survive without Washington. By treating his allies with contempt, Trump has forced his northern neighbour out of its geopolitical vacation. But the US might soon find that an autonomous, well-armed North American partner is far less pliable than one dependent on it for its security. The objective of making America's allies more self-sufficient in security was reasonable; but the arrogant manner in which Trump did it is bound to have a blowback for the US eventually. In the meantime, buoyed by Trump's second coming, Beijing has been quietly upping the ante. For the superpower-in-waiting, it has been displaying open aggression against Taiwan, bullying Japan, and upsetting the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific. And yet, Beijing may soon realise that a world of many autonomous, well-armed middle powers is far harder to dominate than a world led by a single, tired, withdrawing superpower. Rearmament in Berlin and Ottawa will not remain confined to the Atlantic. A Germany that speaks the language of power and a Canada that prioritises strategic insurance will not only project some power to protect their trade interests in the Indo-Pacific but might also inspire Japan and South Korea to raise the stakes in the region. The scramble for security currently underway in Europe could eventually create a new equilibrium in Europe and beyond. For China, this means the Indo-Pacific will become increasingly congested with several new and autonomous powers with their own individual and collective redlines. This unforeseen middle-power scramble for security is giving rise to what Carney calls "variable geometry" - a world where traditional, rigid military alliances are replaced by fluid, mission-specific coalitions of the willing, with or without the backing of the US. Even if a Beijing-Washington bipolarity eventually forms, the international order will feature several centres of gravity, with middle powers pursuing strategic insurance against the whims of major powers. For India, this militarisation by the erstwhile pacifist middle powers is a clear validation of its own tried and tested grand strategy rooted in strategic autonomy in security affairs. For decades, New Delhi was the outlier, criticised, and sometimes even laughed at, for its refusal to join formal blocs and its insistence on seeing itself as a pole in its own right. Today, New Delhi's quest is becoming a norm for middle powers across the world. In their desperate pursuit of strategic autonomy, India has the opportunity to become their logical non-western strategic partner. New Delhi recognizes the strategic opportunity in co-developing high-tech defense platforms with emerging, and militarising, middle powers. A growing group of unhappy middle powers - uneasy about Chinese assertiveness and US transactionalism - now speaks the same language as India. In their quest for absolute security, Putin, Trump, and Xi may have inadvertently empowered a new class of militant middle powers who are likely to come together to hedge against great-power coercion and bullying....