India, Aug. 4 -- A growing number of liberal American geopolitical analysts and Donald Trump, whom they despise, have a few things in common - they are opposed to India's relationship with Russia, its association with Brics, and advocacy for multipolarity. Trump's criticism of India is sharp and direct, of course. The Trump presidency will end in anotherthree-and-a-half years, but this rare consensus in Washington DC, on India's search for multipolarity will remain. This is something, therefore, Indian strategic thinkers must reflect on. Put differently, with or without Trump around, India's advocacy for multipolarity will continue to haunt New Delhi, particularly given the structural transformations underway in the international system today. Let's begin by unpacking some important aspects of multipolarity, given its many layers of complexity and ambiguity. First, notwithstanding the general perception about the virtues of multipolarity, it is becoming somewhat clear that a multipolar world is not as pretty as we had imagined it to be. Even the imperfect multipolarity that we have today - with poles of various sizes and influence competing for power - seems messy, incoherent, confusing and hard to navigate. If this is what a system that is noteven really multipolarlooks like, what will a true multipolar system look like? Second, notwithstanding the messy nature of the quasi-multipolar order today, New Delhi remains committed to a multipolar world. The desire for multipolarity is deeply entrenched in India's tradition of non-alignment, which is one of the first principles of Indian foreign policy. When faced with a difficult choice, the first strategic instinct of political New Delhi is to be non-aligned, neutral, and multi-aligned. Mostly in that order. I would not view that as strategic escapism. It is very much part of the DNA of Indian foreign policy. It would also be wrong to mistake non-alignment (or a variation thereof)as not valuingfriendships, loyalty or solidarity: In fact, India's foreign policy history is rich with examples of friendships, loyalty and solidarity. In that sense, India's foreign policy is not about indecision; it's a constant search for autonomy, balance and agency. This is where the country'sfascination with amultipolar world becomes crucial, for there is no genuine autonomy, balance and agency in world affairs without true multipolarity. Third, India's complaints about American unipolarity are on a steady decline, even as the rhetoric remains. It would be a mistake, however, to view New Delhi's rhetoric against unipolarity as merely, or primarily, directed against the US because today, New Delhi is less anxious about America's global unipolarity than a potential Chinese unipolarity in Asia. While America's declining global unipolarity is mostly a theoretical concern for New Delhi, the prospect of a China-led unipolar Asia is the true source of anxiety. In that sense, New Delhi's desire for multipolarity is also an attempt at ensuring the absence of a unipolar (China-dominated) Asia. Therefore, even if New Delhi is more focused on countering Chinese unipolarity in Asia rather than US unipolarity globally, opposing regional unipolarity without opposing global unipolarity will ring hollow. There are two reasons why New Delhi would be concerned about China's unipolarity in Asia. One, this could mean that China might set the rules of geopolitical engagement in Asia. Once much of Asia falls under China's influence, it will be harder for New Delhi to push back Chinese hegemony. Two, a rise of Chinese unipolarity in Asia might prompt the US to think of accommodating China in a G2 format, especially if the American nativist and isolationist tendencies persist. In an ideal world, New Delhi's articulations must make a clear distinction between American unipolarity and Chinese attempts at unipolarity in Asia, but doing so is not easy for a variety of reasons, including that New Delhi continues to resist aspects of American unipolarity and is not yet willing to acknowledge the possibility of Chinese unipolarity in Asia. But New Delhi's rhetoric against American unipolarity and hegemony, without openly resisting the growing Chinese regional hegemony or a potentially unipolar Asia, could have unintended consequences. Some US administrations, especially the current one, might interpret India's rhetoric against American unipolarity as personal rather than an academic exercise, for the most part. This could prompt an unhappy Washington to undercut India's geopolitical standing in the region, thereby indirectly aiding China's attempts at regional hegemony. This creates a paradox: India aims to counter Chinese unipolarity in Asia by promoting global multipolarity, which annoys the US, prompting it to marginalise India in the region, thereby ultimately aiding Beijing's efforts to establish hegemony in Asia. New Delhi's rhetoric against American unipolarity and hegemony could also prompt the US, which is losing influence in various parts of the world, to seek ways of strengthening its influence in spaces where it can - this could lead to accepting Chinese unipolarity in Asia. More so, if the US reacts negatively towards India, as it is doing now, it could create a fertile ground for China and Russia to fan the Indian rhetoric against the US, encourage India to proactively participate in forums and arrangements aimed at undermining US unipolarity, and generate confusion within India's strategic community about the true motives behind India's multipolarity rhetoric. All of this will further drive the geopolitical wedge between New Delhi and Washington DC. There is no easy way out. New Delhi will need to have a lot more conversations and build trust with the US. That is not easy when a president like Trump occupies the White House....