India, Nov. 5 -- At their summit in Korea last week, Donald Trump and Xi Jinping declared a one-year truce in their trade war. Markets rallied, commodity prices steadied, and business lobbies exhaled. But the truce also set off quiet unease, especially in New Delhi. India had been hoping that the hostility between the US and China would create space for a deeper trade partnership with Washington. Now, with the G2 choosing detente over confrontation, at least temporarily, the strategic and economic calculus has shifted. China could afford to fight back. When Washington raised tariffs, Beijing retaliated. When the US restricted semiconductor exports, China struck back by curbing rare-earth exports critical for American manufacturing and defence industries. America discovered that it was hostage to Chinese supply chains more than it thought. India doesn't have that kind of leverage. America's trade deficit with India accounts for just 3.2% of its total deficit; China's share is nearly 30%. That gap in economic heft translates into negotiating power. China could escalate to negotiate; India cannot. The asymmetry is unavoidable - and it shapes any realistic assessment of how the Trump-Xi truce will affect India's trade prospects. For India, the implications are mixed. The truce could be an opportunity if the US uses this breathing space to consolidate its trade regime and strengthen its security architecture, especially in the Indo-Pacific. A calmer US-China relationship gives Washington the bandwidth to pursue economic diversification without the constant distraction of battling China for economic and geopolitical supremacy. In that scenario, India could still feature prominently - both as a strategic partner and as an alternative node in global supply chains. But the truce could equally turn into a challenge if America interprets it as the foundation for a more stable and less confrontational relationship with Beijing. If Washington sees China less as an adversary and more as a manageable rival, the urgency to conclude an early FTA with India will erode. India will then be pushed down the line in the trade queue. India's economic diplomacy over recent years has revolved around the "China+1" idea, becoming the preferred alternative for global companies seeking to diversify supply chains away from China. That hope was premised on sustained US-China tensions. If the truce leads to even a modest easing of friction, the pressure on multinationals to relocate manufacturing will weaken. Some of the investment that might have flowed to India could remain in China. India could then find itself missing out twice - losing potential investment and being denied the momentum for an early FTA with the US. The US-India trade relationship is structurally asymmetrical. America is India's largest trading partner, but India accounts for a small fraction of America's global trade. That imbalance inevitably constrains New Delhi's bargaining space. Even so, India is not without leverage. Its middle class - 800 million and growing - is one of the world's largest consumer markets. For American firms in technology, health care, and consumer goods, India represents a growth frontier they cannot ignore. Equally, the US cannot easily replace India's service exports. From IT and software development to back-office and professional services, Indian firms are deeply embedded in American corporate ecosystems. This integration gives India quiet leverage, provided it uses it strategically and not defensively. India's approach to the FTA must, therefore, be pragmatic. Conceding too much too quickly risks domestic backlash; holding out indefinitely risks irrelevance. The art lies in finding the overlap between economic logic and political feasibility. Complicating all this is Trump himself. Trade policy under his administration has been anything but predictable. Tariffs appear and disappear overnight. Long-standing allies are threatened one day and courted the next. This volatility makes strategising difficult. The "truce" with Xi may last a year, or it may collapse next month. Trump could pivot from conciliation to confrontation overnight if it suits his domestic politics. That uncertainty cuts both ways for India; it heightens risk but also creates space for tactical flexibility if New Delhi can act decisively when opportunity knocks. What, then, should India's negotiating strategy be? First, anchor trade diplomacy in realism. America's economy is more than five times larger, and its bargaining power proportionately greater. Recognising that asymmetry is prudence, not defeatism. Second, focus on incremental gains rather than an all-encompassing FTA. A limited trade package that covers digital trade, critical minerals, pharmaceuticals and renewable technology could serve as a trust-building step. Demonstrating progress on such a deal will make a broader FTA more achievable. Third, strengthen domestic credibility. Negotiating power abroad rests on performance at home - stable regulation, efficient logistics and a tax regime that rewards investment. Finally, leverage India's strategic value. Even if Washington and Beijing find temporary economic peace, structural distrust between them will likely persist. America still needs reliable partners in the Indo-Pacific. India's value lies not just in trade but in its role as a stabilising regional actor and as a bridge between advanced and emerging economies. The Trump-Xi truce has calmed tempers but scrambled assumptions. For India, it's both a pause and a test - a pause in global trade confrontation, and a test of whether we can convert that calm into advantage. If Washington uses the truce to reset its trade and security strategy, India must ensure it stays at the centre of that recalibration. If the truce evolves into a sustained US-China thaw, India should recalibrate to avoid being pushed to the sidelines. The task is clear: Stay nimble, negotiate smart, and act before the window closes. In geopolitics, as in markets, hesitation is rarely rewarded....