India, June 9 -- Does a tradition of risk aversion continue to define India's strategic culture and its use of force? Does this aversion embolden adversaries to consider the use of force more easily, threaten its use more effectively, and use it more readily? Has our self-professed "peace-loving" identity become a self-fulfilling prophecy, constraining our military doctrines and warfighting impulses? A quick review of the historical record will demonstrate that, despite being a conventionally weaker power, Pakistan has consistently engaged in war initiation vis-a-vis India. Pakistan initiated the 1947-48 war, seizing a large part of Jammu and Kashmir. It also initiated the 1965 war. In 1971, Pakistan attacked Indian airfields, technically initiating the war. And in 1999, India was merely responding to Pakistan's infiltration into the Kargil sector in large numbers. In each case, Pakistan initiated the conflict, and India responded. Let me expand the definition of initiation of hostilities to make a larger point. Pakistan's sponsorship of terrorism against India also falls within the broad definition of conflict initiation. This includes the 2001 Parliament attack (killing nine people), the 2008 Mumbai massacre (over 160 fatalities), the 2016 Uri attack (19 soldiers killed), the Pulwama attack (40 CRPF personnel dead), and the recent Pahalgam killings (26 civilians). In each of these cases, the Pakistani side initiated the hostilities, if you view the use of sub-conventional force as initiation of hostilities. India's response to these sub-conventional attacks from Pakistan has evolved over the past 25 years. Initially, threats were made but not carried out (2001 and 2008), followed by demonstration strikes with minimal effect (2016), and finally, a more selective and measured application of force was adopted in 2019 and 2025. In each instance, Pakistan initiated hostilities, with India either reluctant to respond by using force or being constrained in its use. Let me come to a third aspect regarding the use of force. Despite credibly overcoming its long-held reluctance to use force, India's application of it remains suboptimal, perhaps indicative of a risk-averse strategic culture. Consider, for instance, the recent India-Pakistan standoff. India's use of force, even when it decides to use it, is puzzling in at least three ways, each stemming from a hesitant strategic culture that, while waning from 2001 to 2025, continues to have a profound influence on our conceptions of "appropriate and acceptable" use of force. First, India's decisions regarding the use of force are still largely driven by a reputational imperative - a deep-seated desire to demonstrate to the international community that it is a responsible actor. But in a military conflict, what ultimately matters are the material outcomes, not reputational considerations. Are our reputational urges constraining our military objectives? Second, India is a hesitant user of force. There appears to be a politico-cultural intent to define the limits of force even before it begins - to ensure that it doesn't spread - and we seek to stick to that.. This creates an inherent paradox: India demonstrates an inexplicable preference for using force in ways that minimise impact, rather than maximise its effectiveness. The logic of military force must be to maximise impact with minimal force, as opposed to minimal impact with either maximum or minimal force. This preference for minimal impact and outcomes was evident in the delayed deployment of the Air Force in Kargil (leading to unnecessary casualties on the Indian side), the limited scope of the 2019 strikes, and the self-imposed restriction to targeting only terror infrastructure (as opposed to say targeting Pakistan's air defences) in 2019 and 2025. In each case, it is possible to argue that the employment of force to get maximum impact would have limited the costs we had to incur. By unilaterally declaring that our objective is to use force in a non-escalatory manner, are we needlessly assuming the responsibility of non-escalation on our shoulders? Third, by publicly limiting the scope of military outcomes, we seem to prioritise sending a political message over achieving decisive military outcomes. Here's the problem with that approach. While India seeks to drive home a political point, Pakistan seeks to drive home a military point. While India seeks to limit the scope, impact, targets, and scale of the operation, Pakistan seeks to expand those very variables in its response before the contest is called off. While India approaches the use of force through a political lens, Pakistan prioritises purely military considerations. While India's approach to war reflects Clausewitz's dictum that it is politics by other means, Pakistan appears to use force for military outcomes alone. India's political signaling appears to have little impact on Pakistani military thinking. Thus, the two sides operate with fundamentally different frameworks and India's desire to drive home a political point is lost on Rawalpindi. India's political approach to war isn't fundamentally flawed, but it appears ineffective in the context of India-Pakistan relations. India's risk-averse approach to using force is suboptimal in the India-Pakistan context for two key reasons. First, in Indo-Pak conflicts, history tells us that early gains are not just important, they also are often decisive. An Indian strategy prioritising political messaging, minimum military gains, and delayed third-party intervention is unlikely to produce early gains unlike Pakistan's strategy that prioritises early military gains, little political messaging and quick third-party intervention. And second, by engaging in sub-optimal initiation of conventional force, we allow Pakistan to escalate the conflict and then solicit third-party intervention to end it. By using suboptimal force in a limited timeframe aimed at political messaging without elements of military surprise, we may be allowing Pakistan to seize the military initiative. India's doctrinal evolution on the use of force over the past 25 years has been remarkable, but serious introspection after each military conflict is a must to improve future preparedness, as such conflicts are unlikely to disappear....