India, Aug. 30 -- US President Donald Trump's tariff of 50% on Indian exports - 25% duties plus 25% punitive duties for buying oil from Russia - has come into effect and will seriously impact textiles, jewellery, and a few other major sectors. To add insult to injury, an army of Trump administration officials has been maligning India over its purchases of Russian oil, underscoring little willingness to negotiate on the part of the US. Many in India see Trump's actions as a betrayal by someone who had been befriended by our leadership. They are now urging a shift towards Russia, Brazil, and even China. But is it correct to see India's renewed efforts on deepening these ties as a rebound from the lost friendship with the US ? Isn't strategic autonomy and multi-alignment in our interest? Strategic autonomy was always India's mantra. In the early years, it was non-alignment - steering clear of the Cold War blocs. Later, as the USSR collapsed and India emerged as a growing economic power, multi-alignment became the cornerstone of the latter's stated policy, though Brics with Russia and China as members took a spot behind the US-led Quad. A key reason for this was India's leadership, over the years, accepting the indispensability of close ties with the US - not just for India's growth, but also as a bulwark against the China threat. This found ready support from many in the government, media, and diasporic circles. Those who pointed towards strategic autonomy were told that times had changed and that they had stayed in their well for too long. But the idea of being a formal US ally didn't really fit India's context, and strategic autonomy remains an important pole for the country. India's official reaction to the Trump tariffs was originally muted, with few signs of direct anger against the US and/or posturing for domestic audiences. Now, however, a certain hardening of the not-giving-in stance is being witnessed, and people are being prepared for negative fallouts of a tariff tiff with the US. Interestingly, some in India who pushed for ever-strengthening ties with the US and others who saw convergences with the Make America Great Again (MAGA) crowd are also sounding concern about the tariffs and the US's unwillingness to come around. They are saying this presents an opportunity for India to undertake reforms and push atmanirbhar Bharat. That's not wrong, but certainly is ironic! How did all this happen? In the opinion of this writer, the critical issue is the difference between Trump 1.0, which was an accidental presidency that saw him surrounded not just by nationalists but institutionalists and Trump 2.0. Trump 2.0 is not just centred on the MAGA agenda but is also about showing others down, including those who have traditionally been friends and allies of the US. Canada, Mexico, the EU, Japan, and South Korea are all in this category. Over the past couple of decades, India, too, was placed in this category as it sought closer ties with the US. The power of the US economy has meant that Trump's tariff policies have seriously rattled many, and some of the US's allies, including the EU, have found reason to find ways to get along, even if it appears like appeasement. Moreover, personal chemistry, something seen as critical by our leadership, matters little to Trump, and he is most open to the idea of doing deals, an "art" which he believes he has mastered. For India, the most problematic element could be a deal with China, something that Trump appears keen on. Trump's actions in his present presidential term are fuelled by MAGA ideologues, people interested in personal wealth creation, and his legacy aspirations such as winning the Nobel Peace Prize. Some believe that our unwillingness to give Trump even a proverbial inch on credit for the ceasefire decision after the commencement of Operation Sindoor and the stalemate when it comes to negotiations on a trade deal - with a no-go on agriculture - could have influenced his actions. Access to the Indian market for US agriculture and dairy has a direct impact on Trump's rural MAGA support base. All of this may or may not be true, but Trump 2.0 certainly requires a dispassionate understanding that is free of the belief that the US is a panacea for India. Indeed, here too, things have changed. India is now the largest country in population terms, the largest democracy, and is on its way to becoming the third-largest economy, though it will still have miles to go before becoming a developed nation. No one doubts the critical importance of the US as a strategic partner for India, but it is also important to include in the calculus India's criticality for the US in its geo-politics and domestic politics, including if there is a "deal" with China. It is also important to ensure the availability of a shield against blips, such as the second Trump presidency, in the US's policies. Realistically, while engagement and strengthened ties with the US must certainly be pursued, it is imperative not to exclude other possibilities for India. If the Trump-Putin deal comes to fruition, the lifting of punitive tariffs may provide some relief to India on the oil purchase front. This may then give a renewed push to the Quad Summit, which, in turn, could bring Trump to India and allow a repairing of ties. This, of course, may also happen if Prime Minister Narendra Modi goes to New York for the UNGA meeting and meets Trump. At the same time, India will preside over the Brics in 2026 and host a summit of its leaders, providing a route for the country to pursue multi-alignment. It is important that India sees strategic autonomy not merely as a tool for public pronouncements, but as talk that must be walked....