India, Sept. 2 -- The Narendra Modi-Xi Jinping meeting in Tianjin on August 31, 2025, on the sidelines of the 25th summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), has drawn international attention because it comes in the wake of India's plummeting relations with the US. The improvement in India-China relations has been taking place since Prime Minister Modi and Chinese President Xi met in Kazan, Russia, in October 2024, on the sidelines of the previous SCO summit - their first meeting since the serious clashes between Indian and Chinese forces in Galwan in eastern Ladakh in 2020. The worsening of India-US relations has imparted a significant momentum to the ongoing Sino-Indian rapprochement. The summit did not announce any steps towards de-escalation and de-induction of the more than 50,000 troops ranged on each side of the border in eastern Ladakh. Modi welcomed the stabilisation of the border situation, but to re-establish peace and tranquility, much more needs to follow. The Chinese military alliance with Pakistan remains a major security concern for India. China finds Pakistan a most useful proxy to keep India tethered in the subcontinent and will do whatever is necessary to enable Pakistan to play that role effectively. China has, in the past, supported Pakistan with military hardware and even enabled it to acquire nuclear weapons capability in the 1980s. During the recent Operation Sindoor, China went beyond hardware support to play a critical operational role, providing locational information and intelligence. The SCO declaration explicitly condemns the terrorist attack on Pahalgam, and this is clearly a gesture on the part of China. While this is being celebrated as a win for India, China's "iron brother" relationship with Pakistan is unlikely to change. Both India and China swear by a multipolar order, but India's insistence that this must be based on a multipolar Asia found no echo from China. India must be fully cognisant of these real limits to the two countries evolving any meaningful strategic understanding. Within these limits, the Modi-Xi summit gives India more room for manoeuvre in a rapidly transforming geopolitical landscape. PM Modi's meeting with President Vladimir Putin of Russia was marked, as was expected, with great warmth and a display of goodwill. There was no revival of the Russia-India-China trilateral, but there was a televised huddle among the leaders of the three countries in the corridors as a visual substitute. There is another parallel development that should worry India. US President Donald Trump continues to talk about having very good relations with China and his own friendly relationship with Xi. After expressing concerns about Chinese students flooding American universities, he suddenly declared that he would welcome 600,000 students from China. He paused higher tariffs on China and declared repeatedly that he aims to do a "big deal with China". Whether this happens or not, Trump is signalling that the US's Indo-Pacific strategy, designed to counter Chinese domination of Asia, is no longer a priority. There are reports from the US, not yet confirmed officially, that Trump is unlikely to attend the Quad summit (which comprises India, Australia, Japan, and the US), which India will host later this year. He may be willing to sacrifice Quad if that is the price to pay for his "big deal" with China. The clear winner from all these geopolitical shifts is China, whose power and influence will increase. That cannot be welcome for India. India is most comfortable when its relations with the US and China are better than their relations with each other. India has been alert to these possibilities. This was apparent in Modi's visit to Japan in advance of the SCO summit. The strengthening of India-Japan defence relations, the common declaration of closer cooperation in ensuring security in the Indo-Pacific region, and a significant commitment of Japanese investment in India point to both countries hedging against the US downscaling its Indo-Pacific strategy and, worse, reaching some kind of strategic understanding with China. This kind of "G-2" has been pursued before when Barack Obama took office as US President in 2009. That fell victim to Chinese overreach. It could be different this time round. For China, if the gains from the so-called G-2 are significant - for example, a US abandonment of Taiwan - then relations with India and with several other countries could be the collateral damage. India needs to watch these developments closely. Just as it has doubled down on its partnership with Japan, India should actively pursue similar expanded relations with Australia, whether Quad survives or not. India could take the lead in ensuring that a "trilateral" succeeds the quadrilateral and become the kernel of a broader network of countries in East and Southeast Asia. Any prospect of collusion between the US and China would be as worrisome to the countries of the region as it would be to India. This includes Russia. For India to become a major player in the region, it will need to pursue closer economic and commercial relations with its eastern flank. The economic pillar is as important as the security pillar. There are important components of the India-US partnership that have not been affected by the turmoil at the top. These include technology, defence, and counterterrorism. This could change. Our effort should be to keep this practical cooperation intact, given its importance to India's development objectives. Within these limits, Tianjin marks a modest success in India's efforts to cope with an adversarial US....