India, Aug. 27 -- As they have in the past, India-China relations are once again improving. There is a pattern here. Conflict, tension and freeze are followed by thaw, engagement and a degree of warmth. However, the latest round of reset in Delhi-Beijing ties is also guided by the fact that the US is ceding Asia's geopolitical space to China. This is leading to a dramatic rise in China's profile. And it is compelling America's allies and partners to mend relations with Beijing, despite misgivings. Nearly eight months after President Donald Trump took office, there is no clarity about his administration's policy vis-a-vis China's growing power and influence across Asia and the Indo-Pacific. If one follows Trump's brief, intermittent remarks on any subject over a period of time, one can get a reasonably good sense of what his approach to an issue is. And on this basis, we can tell that he wants to fiercely compete with Beijing on technology, particularly AI. We also know that he is seeking a rationalisation of bilateral trade with China. But he hasn't spoken much on the issue of China and Asian geopolitics. Put differently, there isn't enough in his public speeches and remarks so far to indicate whether he will continue with past American policy of balancing Chinese power and containing Beijing's influence across Asia and the Indian Ocean. However, there is plenty of indirect evidence, which indicates that President Trump may not be enthusiastic about balancing China in Asia. That, in fact, he may be fine with letting China have an increased profile and influence across the region. First, his theory of international politics is that great powers are the only states that truly matter; and that it is natural for a great power to have a sphere of influence. Days after President Trump took office, secretary of state Marco Rubio called for a renewed focus on the Western Hemisphere in American foreign policy. Complementing this, President Trump has in all but name (re)claimed a sphere of influence spanning all of the Americas and the Atlantic. Recall the renaming of the Gulf of Mexico; the bid to retake the Panama Canal; and the calls to make Canada an American state; and also take over Greenland. Furthermore, he has blamed Ukraine for effectively inviting Russia's invasion upon itself. This, coupled with the fact that he ruled out Nato membership for Ukraine and wanted Ukraine to give up territory even before serious negotiations to end the war began, gives the sense that he recognises that it is natural for Russia to have a sphere of influence. Second, Rubio has also said that the world has become multipolar, identifying China and "to some extent" Russia as the other poles. The US is a pole and has a sphere of influence. And if it concedes to China the status of a polar power, then it is natural that Beijing must also have a sphere of influence. It is useful to remember that Beijing and Russia have long characterised the world as multipolar. Third, the US has badly treated some of its closest Asian allies and partners, with whom it has worked for years to balance China. Two of the most dramatic examples are Japan and India, powers that bookend China. Trade negotiations with Japan have been carried out in a fashion that the Japanese think is disrespectful, if not humiliating. And the stunning reversal of American approach to India has ended a quarter century of strategic congruency. America's recent signalling on defending Taiwan against China has been ambivalent, and this is causing Taiwan to work towards security and defence self-reliance. Fourth, the Indo-Pacific strategic architecture looks wobbly. The US is reviewing AUKUS as part of its America First agenda, which has introduced a measure of uncertainty in Australia about America's reliability as a security provider. Such being the case with Japan, India and Australia, the Quad, the centrepiece of that architecture, no longer looks robust. If President Trump does not turn up for the Quad summit, scheduled to take place in India in the coming months, or if the summit is postponed, then the grouping will receive another blow. The undersecretary of defence Elbridge Colby recently used "Asia Pacific", the term that China uses to describe the region. Colby is the one reviewing AUKUS. A blip? Or a signal? To be sure, defense secretary Pete Hegseth has occasionally spoken about America's pivot to Asia and the need to deter China, the latter in a speech at a security conference in Singapore on 31 May 2025. But those were not persuasive. As well as asking America's Asian allies to spend more on their defence, Hegseth's Singapore speech was a one-off and seemed contrived. Direct and indirect evidence suggests that America is no longer willing to underwrite or backstop the security of its Indo-Pacific allies or push back against the Chinese bid for regional dominance. It may in fact let China have a sphere of influence. America's allies have woken up and smelled the coffee. For instance, India, Japan and Australia all face serious security challenges from China, and yet they are expanding and deepening their engagement with a China that America may be turning into Asia's sole great power....