Hits and misses in the one nation, one election idea
India, Aug. 10 -- Over the past decade, the Narendra Modi government has embraced a series of "One Nation" policies aimed at replacing India's diverse patchwork of state-specific policies with uniform, national schemes. From the Goods and Services Tax ("One Nation, One Tax") to the portability of subsidised rations ("One Nation, One Ration Card"), the impulse has been toward centralisation and standardisation.
Now, the government is pursuing one of the most controversial of these projects: One nation, one election. This proposal seeks to replace India's staggered electoral calendar with simultaneous elections for the Lok Sabha and all state assemblies. The idea has featured in Modi's speeches for years but was given a boost in March 2024, when a high-level committee headed by former President Ram Nath Kovind endorsed the idea. In December, the government introduced the Constitution (129th Amendment) Bill to give the Election Commission of India (ECI) the authority to implement such a system. The Bill is currently being reviewed by a joint parliamentary committee.
Modi and his BJP colleagues have long argued that frequent polls disrupt governance, drain resources, and induce short-term populism. India's current electoral calendar ensures that some part of the country is almost always in campaign mode. Proponents argue that constant elections constitute an undue burden on the State's coffers. And the Model Code of Conduct (MCC) - an informal set of norms to ensure a level-playing field during the campaign period - is cited as a source of "policy paralysis". There is obvious appeal to aligning India's staggered election calendar, but there are less disruptive, less dramatic solutions to the underlying problems the government wishes to solve.
The case for simultaneity: The proposed Constitutional amendment would overhaul India's electoral framework. It introduces a one-time transitory provision to dissolve all state assemblies, so their elections coincide with the next Lok Sabha polls, thereafter locking both into a single five-year cycle. If a government - state or national - dissolves mid-term, fresh elections would be held only to complete the remainder of the original term.
Supporters of this far-reaching reform advance three main arguments. First, simultaneous elections will yield savings in time, money, and bureaucratic resources. Political leaders and government machinery, freed from perpetual campaigning, could spend more time on governance. Voters, especially migrants and students, would require less travel. Proponents also point to reduced campaign costs and a lighter administrative burden. Second, fewer elections - they argue - would mean less voter fatigue and greater turnout. Third, they contend that aligned elections would enhance governance efficiency. With the MCC in force less frequently, governments could avoid frequent halts to new projects, and coordination between state and national administrations might improve, particularly if concurrent elections produced aligned political outcomes.
The problems with one-size-fits-all: These arguments have merit, but each is weaker - or more complicated - than advertised. On time savings, the real issue is less about the electoral calendar than about campaign strategy. The BJP, like other parties before it, has deliberately "nationalised" even the most local contests by deploying its top leaders in subnational campaigns. This is a political choice, not a structural necessity. Staggered elections need not mean the constant diversion of national leadership if parties invested in strong state-level leaders.
In terms of costs, India's election administration is remarkably efficient given the scale of the exercise. The 2014 general election cost the central government around 0.03% of GDP. Even including state polls, the share over a five-year period is tiny compared to other budgetary items. If the problem is excessive campaign spending, the answer lies in genuine political finance reform. Instead, the government has gone in the opposite direction, creating opaque mechanisms for political giving such as the unconstitutional electoral bonds scheme.
There are legitimate arguments to be made about the diversion of government officials and security forces to conduct, supervise, and secure elections on a staggered basis. But central paramilitary forces have doubled in size since the 1990s, easing concerns about overstretch. Simultaneous elections would require a larger, one-time deployment - creating its own risks.
In terms of voter fatigue, the evidence from India is mixed. State election turnout has risen since the decline of simultaneous polls in the late 1960s, often exceeding turnout in national elections. And in states where assembly polls closely follow general elections, turnout has often increased (albeit by a smaller margin than in non-proximate elections).
On government efficiency, the MCC is more limited than often claimed: It applies only to states holding elections, not nationwide (except during general elections), and does not halt ongoing programmes. Ironically, simultaneous elections could also result in more - not fewer - elections. According to the proposed amendment, if a government loses a vote of no-confidence and a fresh election is called, the newly elected government will only serve the remainder of the unexpired term. In that case, the efficiency argument for aligned polls no longer holds water.
Risks to democracy and federalism: Beyond these weaknesses lie deeper concerns about democratic design.
First, the essence of parliamentary government is that the executive is continuously accountable to the legislature and, by extension, the public. A shift toward a system resembling fixed terms upends this.
Second, standardising state and national elections on a single cycle creates fewer opportunities for public participation and debate. The current staggered system of elections allows voters to act as a check on a dominant national party.
Finally, the amendment gives the ECI broad discretion to delay polls with few limits and without specifying who governs in the interim. This opens the door to greater central control through President's Rule.
A better way forward: India's current electoral calendar has costs, but there are less intrusive ways to address them. One option is to reform the MCC. The ECI could convene an all-party meeting to shorten the period it is in force or exempt certain categories of government action from its ambit.
A second is to tackle opaque political finance. Parliament could align the Rs.2,000 cash cap with the Rs.20,000 disclosure threshold - or better yet, ban cash contributions altogether and require Aadhaar verification for all donations.
A third is to streamline election scheduling. The 2024 general election stretched over 43 days - the longest voting period in seven decades. Reducing the number of phases would cut the MCC's duration and decrease disruption without changing the staggered nature of elections.
If the government insists on consolidation, compromise models exist. One possibility is one nation, two elections, whereby state polls would be clustered at the mid-point of Parliament's term, reducing frequency while retaining separate state and national verdicts. Another option is aligning national and local body elections - saving costs without undermining the role of state assemblies.
Proceed with caution: One nation, one election is a bold idea. But it risks centralising power, weakening federalism, and paradoxically increasing the frequency of elections. The better path is to fix the specific problems the proposal seeks to solve through targeted reforms that preserve the strengths of India's vibrant, multi-level democracy.
These ideas - less flashy but more practical - have received little airtime in the current debate. They would be a promising place to start....
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