India, March 28 -- India-Pakistan Relations by Satish Chandra, aptly subtitled A Saga of Unending Disputes, is very timely. Its 18 chapters cover the key issues that have bedevilled bilateral relations, some since 1947. Many books have been written on Pakistan but this one stands out for being a concise compendium of issues ranging from Jammu and Kashmir, the sharing of river waters, and terrorism to less-explored subjects such as the disputes over Junagadh, Hyderabad, evacuee property including Jinnah House in Mumbai, Rann of Kutch and the No War Declaration. Interestingly, the book also covers subjects that are not bilateral in nature but are significant for a better understanding of Pakistan's duplicitous actions on key issues, such as the merger under duress of the State of Kalat, the saga of the amalgamation of North-West Frontier Province (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) with Pakistan, and the treatment of the country's minorities. Chandra's vast experience in several key governmental positions, including as high commissioner to Pakistan and as Deputy National Security Advisor, places him in a unique position to review a relationship that is, by far, India's most difficult to manage. When I opened the book, the first page that presented itself happened to be one relating to the erstwhile principality of Mangrol, which, along with Babariawad, acceded to India in 1947 even though Pakistan claimed it alongside Manavadar on the basis of specious claims by the Nawab of Junagadh. My family traces its origins to Mangrol on the coast of the Kathiawar peninsula. My grandfather, barrister CN Chinoy, the Dewan of Rajkot State in the late 1930s and early 1940s, often advised the Sheikh of Mangrol on state matters. We had close friendship with the Sheikh and his family. For the record, Major Mohammed Ali Raaz Sheikh of the 16th Light Cavalry, scion of the princely state of Mangrol, earned a Vir Chakra (posthumous) for bravery in action against enemy armour in the Sialkot Sector on September 8, 1965. I recall reading in Lt Gen (Retd) Harbaksh Singh's memoirs that when he visited the hospital as General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Western Command, a mortally wounded Major Mohammed Ali Raaz Sheikh tried to stiffen his body in a salute even as he lay there drawing his last breaths. So much for Pakistan's fantasy about a two- nation theory. The story of Jammu and Kashmir and its accession to India is well-known but the bias and prejudice of Western powers needs to be retold for the record. After Pakistan made a counter complaint to the UN Secretary General, the UNSC changed the agenda item from one involving Pakistani Aggression to a wider India-Pakistan Question under which even the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP's) mandate was expanded to cover irrelevant issues such as Junagadh. The author narrates how, at a time when Pakistan was waging war against India in Kashmir after independence, the Reserve Bank of India paid Rs 75 crore from its cash balances and a total of Rs 228 crore (part in pound sterling) from its Issue and Banking Departments to the aggressor. Mahatma Gandhi went on a fast to ensure Pakistan's demand was met. Astonishingly, India also took over Pakistan's pre-Partition debt and gave the latter the facility to repay it in 50 instalments from 1952 onwards. It is a different matter that the "mutilated, truncated and moth-eaten" state, as Jinnah himself described it in lament, reneged on its obligations. The author details Pakistan's appalling record of abusing its minorities since inception, especially the bulk of the exodus that took place from West Pakistan in 1947-48. The outflow from East Pakistan was gradual by contrast, peaking in 1971 when the Pakistani Army conducted genocide against East Pakistanis, especially the Hindu minority. The author attributes the root cause to the politics of hatred and violence unleashed by the Muslim League and its two-nation theory. The perfidy of British officers fanned this sentiment. The author avers that Pakistan is beyond redemption on this aspect and that it will spare no effort to undermine India. The chapter on the Rann of Kutch conflict is interesting. It is one of the few disputes that India agreed to subject to arbitration in the 1960s, because Pakistan kept raking it up even though the alignment had been settled decades before between the Maharao of Kutch and Sind. I dealt with coastal security and the Harami Nala issue during my stint with the National Security Council Secretariat and have visited the disputed areas along the G- pillar line. Having secured India's agreement to the alignment of the vertical line between BoP 1175 and BoP 1153, Pakistan challenged the horizontal G- pillar line to promote a fiction of claims further eastwards in the Creek area. On the Durand Line, Satish Chandra has rightly underlined that the line was never clearly defined and the oft-referred-to 1893 Agreement did not make it a sacrosanct international border. Soon after the departure of the British, the Afghans repudiated all treaties made with them, including the Durand Line, and called for an independent Pakhtunistan. It was the only country that opposed Pakistan's admission to the UN. None of the Afghan governments over the years, including the Taliban, has recognised the Durand Line. I was pleasantly surprised to see a reference attributed to me and a mention of "colonial cartographic caper" used for the Durand Line issue....