India, Nov. 11 -- Pakistan's parliament is currently debating the proposed 27th Constitutional Amendment, which aims to overhaul Article 243 and fundamentally reshape the control and command of the country's armed forces. The debate on this issue is largely inconsequential, given the army's strong grip on the country's political landscape. Having been promoted to field marshal after the India-Pakistan standoff earlier this year and buoyed by US President 's personal support, Pakistan army chief Asim Munir is swiftly consolidating his personal influence over the armed forces, of the army over other services, and of the Pakistan military over the civilian leadership of a country - thereby further intensifying an already deeply lopsided civil-military relationship. The 27th Amendment aims to introduce significant changes to Pakistan's civil-military relations and the military's role. It proposes the establishment of a chief of defence forces (CDF), who will command all three services - the army, navy, and air force. The CDF will always be the chief of the army staff, whose tenure has been increased to five years. To make way for the CDF, the longstanding but ceremonial role of chairman joint chiefs of staff committee (CJCSC) will be dissolved later this month, coinciding with the retirement of the current CJCSC, General Sahir Shamshad Mirza. While military titles for officers promoted to five-star ranks (such as field marshal, marshal of the air force, and admiral of the fleet) are not unusual, the immunity from removal except through impeachment is a unique feature of Pakistan. The amendment also proposes appointing a commander of the national strategic command (CNSC) to oversee all nuclear and strategic assets. This post will be appointed by the prime minister on the army chief's recommendation, from within the army, shifting control away from civilian oversight. The centralisation of power with minimal resistance has never been this blatant in Pakistan, even during the heights of the Pervez Musharraf regime. These developments have significant implications for both Pakistan and India. For Pakistan, it signals the ascent of general Asim Munir as the dominant figure in the country, arguably the most powerful person since Zia-ul-Haq, the military ruler who governed Pakistan from 1977 to 1988. Munir may be even more powerful than Zia; he has wielded this influence without a military coup, without facing international pushback for undermining democratic institutions with active help from the political class, and without any direct governance responsibilities. He has also managed to restore the army's image within Pakistan from its weakened state a year ago, secured a prolonged tenure, and gained lifetime immunity, thereby consolidating his dominance quietly but effectively. The timeline of his rise to power is interesting. Although he became army chief in November 2022, he gained prominence earlier this year with an anti-Hindu tirade claiming that Hindus and Muslims cannot co-exist. This statement came exactly a month before the horrific Pahalgam attack, in which innocent civilians were targeted by terrorists traced to Pakistan. Immediately after the standoff with India, Pakistan launched a propaganda campaign to claim a 1971-like victory, which Munir leveraged to strengthen his internal position and secure the rank of field marshal. He then orchestrated Pakistan's rather clever outreach to President Trump, who appeared to have developed a favourable view of Munir. He has also made serious strategic outreach to West Asia, including formalising a defence pact with Saudi Arabia. With the proposed amendment, Munir's tenure will extend to five years, he will command all three services, and gain lifetime immunity, all within just eight months, at a time when Pakistan's economy is experiencing severe stress. Today, there is little challenge to Munir in Pakistan even though he has not captured executive power in the country. This will undoubtedly deepen existing fissures within Pakistan's military, where the army has historically held a privileged position. The current amendment effectively makes the army chief the de facto commander of the air force and navy as well - an outcome that the two services are likely to strongly oppose. The creation of the CNSC, always to be manned by an army officer, will ensure that all of Pakistan's nuclear weapons and delivery systems, including second-strike missiles traditionally under naval control, will be under the army's exclusive authority. In short, one man will command all three of Pakistan's military forces for five years and command its nuclear forces. The amendment signals a definitive shift toward greater military dominance in Pakistan's defence and strategic policymaking - a coup without a formal coup. In Pakistan, the army already controls the country; soon, this control may become enshrined in the constitution. Even though Munir is only formalising the existing dominance of the military and reinforcing the army's superior position in Pakistan's civil-military relations, the constitutional amendment, unlike an executive order, will make it near impossible for future leaders to reverse the imbalance. The Pakistan army, under an empowered Munir, whose antipathy towards India is well known, poses a significant challenge to India. If the Pakistan army has traditionally been India-focused, it will now be even more intensely so. The general public, Imran Khan's supporters, and Pakistani civil society are likely to resist these changes. In such a scenario, a diversionary war or conflict with India could be seen as the most effective strategy, as it tends to unify the country under the army's anti-India narrative. India must, therefore, keep a close watch on Munir's moves....