India, July 3 -- Quad took a significant step in its long journey to shed ambiguity and reveal its true purpose on Tuesday in Washington DC. The US, India, Japan, and Australia signed on to a joint statement that was more pointed and critical of Chinese actions in the maritime domain than in the past. Quad also categorically called out China's economic coercion, price manipulation, supply-chain disruptions, and use of non-market principles to concentrate production in critical minerals. In classic diplo-speak, the statement did all of this using the passive voice without attributing actions to the agent. To be sure, each edition of Quad has witnessed the introduction of a more critical nuance against Beijing and an additional layer of tech, economic, or security cooperation with the subtext of countering China. But this week's Quad meeting was much sharper in its focus. It also narrowed down cooperation to maritime security, economic security, critical and emerging technologies, and humanitarian assistance. The advantage of this sharp approach is that the fluff is out, and all sides are discussing real actionable items. The disadvantage is there is drastic dilution of the agenda and many valuable items of cooperation may get lost. But the Quad statement is significant because a strong diplomatic rebuke of China has become rare. Indeed, the big geopolitical picture of the moment is that China is on the geopolitical comeback trail after five years. The onset of Covid-19 in early 2020 woke the world to the dangers of opaque systems that can suppress information with globally devastating consequences. China's weaponisation of its overwhelming advantage in manufacturing awoke the world to the need for diversified supply chains. China's inroads into eastern Ladakh alerted New Delhi to the dangers of a belligerent neighbour that was willing to violate Indian sovereignty. China's continuous aggression in the East China Sea, South China Sea, and around Taiwan made the region aware of Beijing's territorial and maritime ambitions. China's predatory economics made Global South nations conscious of the downsides of Chinese development and investment flows. China's stunning technological, military, and economic strides awoke the US to its "peer-level competitor". Under the first Donald Trump administration, the Joe Biden administration, and under a set of Indo-Pacific leaders worried about Beijing, there was a concerted approach to take on this Chinese machine. American export controls on chips were meant to slow down China's progress. The US began building stronger countervailing coalitions in the Indo-Pacific. It encouraged plurilaterals, trilaterals, and strengthened bilaterals to shape the environment around China. The US married strategic and defence imperatives with business opportunities and innovated with new tech partnerships. It expanded its developmental, climate, and security footprint in neglected regions such as the Pacific Islands. This period saw China's internal vulnerabilities get more pronounced. Beijing's Covid-19 crackdown boomeranged. Its real estate and infrastructure-fuelled boom created a crisis. Its domestic consumption paled in comparison to its production excess. Its demographic policies generated social fissures and policy pressures. It seemed relatively friendless in the region. And theories about how China had peaked gathered traction. That 2020-2024 era of rising global estrangement with China is over. 2025 may well be the year when everyone wants to become friends with China again. The effort to construct a bridge between Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific theatres has faltered. Even as Russia and China work more closely together, the US is now doing little to bridge the gap between Nato and Indo-Pacific allies and is instead pressuring both simultaneously to step up on defence. The Australian, South Korean, and Japanese heads of government decided to stay away from the Nato summit in The Hague. European countries, both collectively and separately, are seeking to cut deals with China. To many in Europe, a closer working relationship with China seems safer than putting their eggs in the unpredictable American basket. America itself is sending signals of wanting a deal with China. Trump, to lend retrospective coherence to a badly thought out tariff policy, made it all about China in April. As soon as markets responded negatively and inflationary concerns became real, he did a deal by mid-May. When the deal showed cracks and China imposed restrictions on exports of rare earths, the US showed a willingness to lift restrictions on exports and visas. Nikkei now reports that Trump is exploring a visit to China with a major business delegation. China's dependencies are real, Beijing is far more keen to do a deal than it publicly lets on, and no one is discounting either the structural rivalry or US advantages. But, in this entire episode, China has shown it has cards too and held its own to a large extent, while American vulnerabilities have become visible. And then you have China's neighbours. Despite Japan's fundamental security contradiction with China, Trump has made life so difficult for Tokyo that it cancelled a 2+2 ministerial dialogue with the US and is engaged in a public acrimonious fight on auto tariffs - any such rift plays to China's advantage. South Korea's new government is all about a more balanced approach to foreign policy compared to its pro-US conservative predecessor. Australia is struck by the Pentagon's review of the AUKUS pact and Trump hasn't even met Prime Minister Anthony Albanese. And India is sending public signals of rapprochement with China - despite China being the force behind Pakistan's military response during Operation Sindoor, India's own border tensions, the trade asymmetry that emanates from Chinese manufacturing dominance, and Beijing's efforts to construct a hostile architecture in South Asia. New Delhi's political troubles with the US due to Trump's false claims on peacemaking, mediation, and trade could only have made China happy. And in smaller countries in the region, American instruments of influence in the form of foreign aid, foreign trade, and liberal visa policy have all but gone, leaving the ground open for more Chinese presence. Neither was China about to collapse or get isolated in the past four years, nor is it about to take over the world now. But there is a shift that suits Beijing. As the next Quad chair, India's challenge is framing a credible and strong agenda that takes into account this adverse diplomatic environment....