India, Aug. 21 -- Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi's just concluded visit to India and the agreement between the two sides on the India-China boundary question is an encouraging sign in mending the relationship between the two countries, which has been struggling to normalise since the border standoff in 2020. Wang Yi's visit to Delhi and the agreement outlining several measures to manage the contested border ahead of Prime Minister Narendra Modi's planned trip to China for the annual Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Summit also reflect broader changes occurring in geopolitics. The India-China dynamics must also be read in conjunction with the engagement of the two countries with Russia. The three-way conversations involving Russia, India, and China are noteworthy as it is reflective of the broader regional geopolitical realignments in response to US policies towards them. External affairs minister S Jaishankar is now in Russia. For both India and China (as also for Russia), the three-way conversations present an excellent opportunity to signal to Washington that there are possibilities of alternative global blocs and realignments outside of Washington's orbit and influence. What is perhaps more important and consequential are the underlying causes behind the current bonhomie between India and China. Beyond the optics, it is also evident that both India and China are eager to achieve a degree of normalcy in their relationship. The statement from the ministry of external affairs on the outcomes of Wang's India visit testifies to that. It is, therefore, possible to argue that there is a convergence between New Delhi and Beijing on the need to normalise bilateral relations. However, their respective definitions of normalcy are different. For China, normalcy means moving on from the current border impasse with India and focussing on the global balance of power. As Wang said, "We (India and China) should never allow bilateral relations to be defined by the boundary question or specific differences to affect the overall picture of our bilateral ties." Without normalcy with India, China knows that it will not be in a position to leverage Indian unhappiness with US President Donald Trump for its own larger geopolitical purposes. In other words, China seeks to exploit the current opportunity to challenge the US's global supremacy, and for that purpose, normalcy with India would be helpful. But the question is whether Beijing is willing to engage in sustained give-and-take negotiations with New Delhi to settle the border issue. For New Delhi, normalcy with China is centred on disengagement at the border so that it can focus on the larger geopolitical questions of India-China relations, India-China-Russia dynamics, and so on. For India, normalcy on the border and status quo ante bellum as of 2020 is key. China's global objectives behind the current warmth towards India should not be missed. Wang stated recently that "as important members of the Global South, we have the responsibility to take the lead in opposing hegemonism and power politics". There is little doubt that China would want to use India and Russia, and the Global South, to target the US-led world order. However, let's be clear. If Trump offers a G-2 with China, Beijing is likely to settle for it, sacrificing its secondary geopolitical equations. A similar logic extends to Russia as well. Moscow would vociferously promote the virtues of an alternative world order outside of the US orbit, but what it wants is to be recognised and treated by Washington and Europe as a great power and be accommodated within the European balance of power system, rather than being part of a China-led global order. As for India, it will continue to emphasise the importance of the Global South, multipolarity, and global alternatives, but New Delhi is not comfortable being part of a China-led, Russia-backed, non-American world order. If India is accommodated into a US-led world order as an important stakeholder, New Delhi is likely to accept that. In an ideal world, New Delhi would prefer to see Chinese power balanced by the US and/or Russia. However, since these options are not currently available, it is inclined to settle for underbalancing China, given its lack of capacity to balance Beijing on its own. In that sense, the three countries - India, China, and Russia - are hedging against geopolitical uncertainties and opting for their respective second-best options. This essential geopolitical dynamic should not be lost on our policymakers. In the meantime, and notwithstanding the deep mistrust between the two countries, India needs to engage with China for two key reasons. For India, conflict management with China is a key issue, as the fundamental contradictions in the relationship are unlikely to disappear soon. Therefore, it is essential to establish and strengthen confidence-building measures (CBMs) to manage Sino-Indian tensions. In that sense, the recent agreements are in the right direction. A no less important reason for India to engage with China on a sustained basis is that managing the relationship with Beijing - its rise as a global power and ambitions for superpower status, aggressive pursuit of its territorial ambitions, and attempts at unipolarity in Asia - is going to be India's most crucial task for the next several decades. From that perspective alone, New Delhi will need to engage productively with Beijing....