India, Sept. 4 -- Prime Minister (PM) Narendra Modi's first visit to China after seven years and his meeting with President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit have generated much excitement and yielded modest gains in the ongoing process of rebuilding bilateral relations that had slid post Galwan. It also highlights the challenges in navigating this complex relationship amid an exceptionally uncertain global landscape that is to India's disadvantage. A revealing contrast lies in how each side is framing external pressures: Modi emphasised that bilateral ties "should not be seen through a third country lens" while Xi warned against "external interference". Earlier, during foreign minister Wang Yi's visit to New Delhi, Chinese read-outs claimed that India had joined China in opposing "unilateral bullying", a barely disguised reference to the US. This divergence is not semantic - it reflects differing strategic objectives. India, even while confronted with exorbitant tariffs, President Donald Trump's tantrums, and other negative signals from Washington, seeks to preserve its strategic partnership with the US. China, facing containment pressures and sensing India's vulnerability, would like to project a common stance against the US. Both seek greater manoeuvrability, but structural problems in ties do not offer space for strategic realignment. The answer to India's current predicament vis-a-vis the US does not lie in revising its assessment of China as its primary strategic challenge, unless facts suggest otherwise. That is why it is surprising that the rhetoric of India and China being "development partners and not rivals", much favoured by Beijing, has been resurrected by us. There are legitimate questions about this formulation and the assessment that there is far more convergence than differences between the two countries. Are such conclusions plausible, after China's extensive support to Pakistan during Operation Sindoor, continued heavy deployment of troops in border areas, denial of critical products to India, initiation of the world's largest hydropower and infrastructure project with serious downstream impact on India, and other outstanding issues? China wants India to reiterate the "One China principle", and Taiwan being part of China, something we have not done for the last 15 years. Indeed, Chinese read-outs of Wang's recent meetings in New Delhi claimed that Indian leaders had reaffirmed those positions. After the external affairs ministry clarified that there is no change in India's position on Taiwan, the Chinese Foreign Office spokesperson bluntly stated, " ... the Indian side's so-called 'clarification' came as a surprise. We find it inconsistent with the facts. It would seem that some people in India have tried to undermine China's sovereignty on the Taiwan question and impede the improvement of China-India relations. China expresses serious concern and firmly opposes that." India needs to be less inhibited about speaking out on China's battlefield collusion with Pakistan and other issues. That can be done even while pursuing stable and constructive relations with China. Both countries have much to gain from bringing the relationship back to a more normal footing. But that can only be achieved in a calibrated manner, without ignoring inconvenient truths. The focus on people-centric initiatives, such as direct flights, resumption of border trade, augmentation of Kailas-Mansarovar pilgrimage, and easing of visas, is sensible. Quietly, we have worked to ease the supply of critical imports from China with some success. However, weaponisation of dependencies by China, the US, and others, underlines the imperative of addressing our vulnerabilities through economic de-risking vis-a-vis China (and others). Given China's pole position in global value chains, closer trade and investment links should also feature abundant safeguards. During Wang's India visit and Modi's meeting with Xi, a dual-track approach appears to be emerging, where India is pushing for progress on border related issues even while moving towards normalisation of relations. In his meeting with Xi, Modi "underlined the importance of peace and tranquillity on the border areas for continued development of bilateral relations", but the Chinese readout cites Xi as saying that the two countries must "not let the border issue define" the overall relationship. While this divergence will persist, China seems to have tacitly acknowledged that the border issue has returned to the centre stage of bilateral relations. However, China seems keen to revive its "early harvest" proposal to show progress in boundary negotiations. China wished to limit this early harvest to Sikkim - unacceptable to India as this piecemeal approach was not consistent with the "package settlement" envisaged under the 2005 Agreement on Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for Boundary Settlement. Besides, China would press for the boundary in the Sikkim Sector to be on the basis of the Convention of 1890 between Great Britain and China on Sikkim and Tibet, which shows the starting point of the boundary at "Mount Gipmochi" (Gyemochen), a position not acceptable to India. It is not clear whether the scope of the "early harvest" will include both Sikkim and Middle Sectors or only the Sikkim Sector. If it is the latter, the revival of a proposal rejected earlier for good reasons is puzzling. The two sides have also agreed "to discuss de-escalation, beginning with the principles and modalities thereof". Any de-escalation must keep in mind India's disadvantages vis-a-vis the nature of terrain and infrastructure and, thereby, the longer re-induction time needed. Article III (3) of the Agreement on Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field of November 1996 stipulated that ceilings on forces deployed in specific pockets shall be determined "with due consideration being given to parameters such as the nature of terrain, road communication and other infrastructure and time taken to induct/de-induct troops and armaments". Any numerical equivalence in force levels will put India at a serious disadvantage. The future trajectory of ties will be determined by China's willingness to acknowledge India's interests, concerns, and aspirations as a co-ascendant power. Current evidence is not encouraging. At the SCO summit, China reiterated its preference for a "multipolar world", while India batted for "a multipolar world and a multi-polar Asia". Xi spoke of "dancing of the dragon and the elephant" as the right choice for both China and India, but this tango does not acknowledge the need to accommodate India's rise as a major power. The present situation demands strategic clarity on assessments, strategic patience in seeking outcomes, and strategic autonomy as our overall compass....