India, May 13 -- After many days of being on the precipice of an all-out war, both India and Pakistan agreed to a tentative cessation of hostilities. While US President Donald Trump was first to announce the stopping of hostilities, New Delhi announced that Pakistan's director general of military operations (DGMO) contacted his Indian counterpart at 3:35 pm on May 10, following which it was agreed that all military action from "land, air and sea" will cease. More crucially, India announced a major strategic shift an hour prior to ceasing the military action. New Delhi said any future act of terror against India would be considered an "act of war". This means that instead of responding with counterterror operations, which are conservative and contained, operations such as Operation Sindoor will be the new norm. As part of Operation Sindoor, the Indian military took direct aim at Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) and Lashkar-e-Taiba's (LeT) strongholds across the border in Bahawalpur and Muridke. For years, India has tried to bring Pakistan-promoted terrorism to the forefront of international discourse with limited success. While diplomacy and politics will remain as a core part of its toolkit, penetrative strikes deep inside Pakistan targeting the ideological and operational arteries of the likes of JeM and LeT are expected to be normalised. The first phase of Operation Sindoor in the early hours of May 7, led by a kinetic response to the Pahalgam terror attack which claimed 26 lives, is in part a breakdown of India's patience of prioritising the diplomatic and political routes in its efforts to tame Pakistan-based terrorist entities. India's counterterror operations across the Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir have been consistent over the decades and have as a matter of habit repelled incursions by cadres of LeT, JeM, and others. However, the strategic choices made this time have arguably added a new dimension to how New Delhi intends to respond going forward. It is not anymore merely about terror groups but also about going after the State that backs the former and its institutions. The targeting of JeM facilities in Bahawalpur, a town just over 100 km from the international border using standoff weapons is the deepest the Indian military has struck inside Pakistan since the 1971 war. Within an escalatory policy, this act brings India's decision to scale up counterterror strikes since the previous operations - namely the 2016 surgical strikes and the 2019 Balakot strikes. Both these were responses to terror attacks against Indian military installations in Uri and Pathankot and were made publicly instead of clandestinely as special operations. JeM and LeT alike have reportedly taken significant casualties in the strikes against them, including family members of JeM founder Masood Azhar, one of India's most wanted since his release from a Kashmiri prison during the hijacking of IC 814 in 1999. Pictures of Pakistani military officials attending funerals of slain terrorists draped in the State flag were displayed by India during a press conference headed by the foreign secretary. In essence, this strategy is the opposite of the dossier diplomacy that India attempted following the Mumbai terror attacks in 2008 to rally global support. In an era of hyper-information, old rule books stand obsolete. While the current operations are unlikely to dismantle JeM or LeT in the long term, they do normalise administrating big costs on the Pakistani State for actions taken by its proxies who have had a free hand and safe havens for a long period of time. However, much like the case in 2016 and 2019, installation of long-term and systemic deterrence may remain elusive and the likes of JeM and LeT may use their losses to force-multiply cadres, financing, and intent. Further, declarations of support from peers of Pakistani groups, such as the public backing by Al Qaeda in Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), is also a reminder for the international community that terrorism remains a global scourge with Pakistan as its heart. International terrorism has been dealt with through a gamut of strategies over the decades. In the 1960s and 1970s, aircraft hijackings were a chosen method by pro-Palestine factions. Kashmir faced the brunt of terrorism across the 1990s, and the 9/11 attacks against the US in 2001 changed the global narrative of countering terrorism led by the American mobilisation of unchallengeable political and military power. Today, the global US-led security blanket against terrorism is eroding. Washington itself has previously struck deals with the Taliban, and more recently, has attempted talks with both Hamas and the Houthis. While many see this as a fracture of global counterterror mechanisms, it can be an opportunity for India to lead and double down on anti-terror designs in multilateral forums, with its partners ranging from the United Nations to the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation - all the while ensuring that kinetic costs keep the potential of a long-term conventional conflict both a rarity and well below the nuclear threshold, even as Rawalpindi's nuclear sabre-rattling has been called out. Finally, while countering terrorism remains a priority, within strategic and political thinking, Pakistan and its support for terror should not become India's strategic identity. New Delhi must continue to dehyphenate from Pakistan while maintaining its larger geopolitical goals. Rawalpindi's aim is to drag India down to its level of irrelevance. Such trappings should be dismissed....