India, Nov. 6 -- "Beyond the words on the page of the agreement is the spirit and the confidence that has given to our two great countries to work even more closely together," noted Keir Starmer, the British Prime Minister, during his recent visit to Mumbai. He was referring to the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) the two countries signed. The agreement promises to augment bilateral trade volume by £25.5 billion every year from its current standing at £44.1 billion. The UK-India Technology Security Initiative adds collaborative substance in the critical minerals and Artificial Intelligence space. But the spirit of this story, as Starmer hinted, is fundamentally political. India's ties with Britain are undergoing a silent revolution. The timing is notable. A relationship long tainted by mistrust, despite known historical depth and interactive breadth, is on the mend in an age of collapsing order. From resenting London's relations with Pakistan, to rubbishing post-Brexit Britain as strategically inconsequential, India took measures big and small to communicate its anger to Whitehall. In return, London kept its guard up with what it viewed as a Russia-friendly power that excels in protectionism, is prickly in diplomacy, and overconfident in its posturing. No more. The shift in needle is not just on trade and tech, but also in the security sphere. The former plays out on the frontstage, and the latter on the backstage. On trade, the UK urgently needed trading partners as Brexit loomed. The India-UK Roadmap 2030, released in 2021, concentrated minds on opportunities and initiated CETA negotiations in 2022. The strategic urgency of this deal was not lost on London. Britain needed India. But the translation of political will into action amidst a fast-moving round of ministerial musical chairs required the civil service to up its game. Mostly occurring on the backstage, the changes in how Whitehall responded to the moment remain underappreciated. India started talking trade, and Britain began speaking security. New Delhi's decision to appoint a new high commissioner to London in 2022 changed the game. Vikram Doraiswamy cracked the British cultural code that more gets done over proverbial pints than formal luncheons. In response, Whitehall appointed a former cyber security head of Northern Irish heritage as high commissioner to New Delhi in 2024. Lindy Cameron entered the role with expansive knowledge of the emergent tech landscape, openness to India's security concerns, and awareness of Britain's complicated colonial legacies. The resulting synergies were topped by candid conversations between national security advisors and foreign ministers. The Khalistan issue tested the relationship. A crisis that risked burning bridges, ended up strengthening ties. To be sure, Indian, and British views continue to differ on this issue. But there is more understanding than misunderstanding. The UK responded by owning the radicalisation of pro-Khalistan elements as a British problem and responsibility. In turn, India went the extra mile to reassure Whitehall that it was not in the business of extrajudicial and extraterritorial coercion to tackle such problems. It took time for such messages to percolate and sediment. But today both sides discuss counterterrorism more than they have before, and more than one would have imagined two years ago. Such understandings have helped Raisina Hill and Whitehall to better manage the troika of China, Russia, and Pakistan. Both countries have identical approaches towards China. They view Beijing as a security challenge but seek to capitalise on its economic potential. Regarding Russia and Pakistan, the gulf remains but has reduced. London has learnt to accommodate India's Russia equities without giving up on sanctions against private entities that indirectly finance Russia's war machine. Similarly, New Delhi has developed a nuanced view of Britain's Pakistan equities. Whitehall does not hold a roseate view of Pakistan. But to prevent risk spillover, it needs to engage Rawalpindi. Far from hyphenating, engagement with both countries is an expression of Britain's realities, which is, India offers opportunity, and Pakistan accrues risk. This foregrounds the final, paramount, challenge. The US presidency under Donald Trump is a disruptive force. While Trump's focus on Russia is welcome in London, Whitehall will not let its relationship with India become hostage to the whims of a mercurial White House. This is why it will not impose punitive tariffs despite pressure to do so from across the pond. Plus, Pakistan's army chief Asim Munir will not be feted in the UK the way he has been in the US post Operation Sindoor, routine engagements notwithstanding. London is increasingly, and meaningfully, sensitive to India's strategic concerns across the subcontinent and the Indian Ocean. The value of this partnership, then, is not lost on New Delhi. India needs Britain. But revolutions, good or bad, and trust, built or inherited, must never be taken for granted. To ensure that these successes are not lost to expected and unexpected turbulence, both sides need to be clear-eyed about two things. One, improved trade is not an insurance against future risk. Britain is facing severe economic and political tumult. In this environment, English nativism typified by Reform UK and weaponised by figures such as Tommy Robinson risks translating into targeting of British Indians - just like the Make America Great Again (MAGA) movement did with Indian Americans. This will test the bilateral. Two, depending on the direction the Russia-Ukraine war takes and how Europe responds, India could drop in the UK's prioritisation. Both sides need to prepare for such eventualities and ensure that diverging priorities do not become conflicting interests....